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This  review  integrates  cognitive,  socioemotional,  and  neuroimaging  perspectives  on  self-
development.  Neural  correlates  of key  processes  implicated  in  personal  and  social  identity
are reported  from  studies  of  children,  adolescents,  and  adults,  including  autobiographical
memory,  direct  and  reﬂected  self-appraisals,  and  social  exclusion.  While  cortical  midline
structures  of  medial  prefrontal  cortex  and medial  posterior  parietal  cortex  are  consistently
identiﬁed  in  neuroimaging  studies  considering  personal  identity  from  a primarily  cognitive
perspective  (“who  am  I?”),  additional  regions  are  implicated  by  studies  considering  per-
sonal and  social  identity  from  a more  socioemotional  perspective  (“what  do others  think
about me,  where  do  I ﬁt  in?”),  especially  in child  or adolescent  samples.  The  involvement
of  these  additional  regions  (including  tempo–parietal  junction  and  posterior  superior  tem-dentity poral sulcus,  temporal  poles,  anterior  insula,  ventral  striatum,  anterior  cingulate  cortex,
middle cingulate  cortex,  and  ventrolateral  prefrontal  cortex)  suggests  mentalizing,  emo-
tion, and  emotion  regulation  are  central  to self-development.  In  addition,  these  regions
appear  to  function  atypically  during  personal  and  social  identity  tasks  in autism  and  depres-
sion,  exhibiting  a  broad  pattern  of  hypoactivation  and  hyperactivation,  respectively.© 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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Self-development results in an intricate and some- also acquire a sense of being intimately connected with
hat paradoxical product. We  grow to see ourselves as
nique,  coherent, and bounded entities with personal pref-
rences,  abilities, and characteristics (Harter, 1999), but we
∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +1 541 346 1984.
E-mail address: jpfeifer@uoregon.edu (J.H. Pfeifer).
878-9293/$ – see front matter ©  2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
oi:10.1016/j.dcn.2011.07.012others in relationships and groups (Ruble et al., 2004).
Most research attempting to understand this complex phe-
nomenon  has been philosophical or behavioral in nature,
but  for over a decade and a half, neuroimaging technolo-
gies have been employed in attempts to uncover how the
brain  supports the endpoint of this prolonged path to a
rich  and multifaceted self, and in the last several years
tal Cogn56 J.H. Pfeifer, S.J. Peake / Developmen
developmental populations have been folded into the
scope  of these inquiries (Pfeifer et al., 2007; Sebastian et al.,
2008).  In this manuscript, we review evidence identify-
ing  the neural correlates of the self and its development.
As an organizing principle, we argue that the most suc-
cessful and complete approach to understanding how the
brain  supports self-development will integrate cognitive,
socioemotional, and neuroimaging perspectives.
The self in psychological science is an umbrella term
encompassing such diverse constructs as self-awareness,
agency, self-recognition, self-esteem, self-concept, the
social  self and self-enhancement (Leary and Tangney,
2003; Sedikides and Spencer, 2007). Likewise, evolutionary
approaches such as that of Robins and colleagues (Robins
et  al., 2008) have identiﬁed several adaptive functions of
the  self: self-regulation, identity formation, and its utility as
an  information-processing ﬁlter and basis for understand-
ing others. In the current paper we take an ontogenetic
perspective on just one of these many facets of the self
–  namely that of identity and its formation. One classic
developmental approach (Erikson, 1968) divides identity
into  personal aspects that mark the self as a distinctive
individual, and social aspects that highlight group afﬁl-
iations, roles, and relationships (as well as into the ego
which is aware of the self and its continuity over time). This
approach includes the familiar depiction of the adolescent
conﬂict over ﬁdelity (identity vs. role confusion), which
highlights three predominant themes of self-development
emphasized in this manuscript: who am I, what do others
think  about me,  and where do I ﬁt in?
Much of the answer to “who am I?” is embodied in
the self-concept, which contains evaluative self-knowledge
that is organized by domains (social, academic, athletic,
family, etc.) and contributes to overall global self-worth
(Harter, 1999; Marsh, 1990). In adults, the self is consid-
ered an exceptional structure for organizing information;
it conveys mnemonic advantages (the self-reference effect;
Rogers  et al., 1977; Symons and Johnson, 1997), and facili-
tates  behavioral responses owing to implicit associations
between attributes and the self (Greenwald and Banaji,
1989; Markus, 1977). A large body of research, primarily
in  the ﬁeld of social psychology, therefore takes this and
other  related cognitive perspectives on the self’s functions
(Greenwald, 1981; Kihlstrom et al., 2002; Kihlstrom and
Klein,  1994; Klein, 2001; Klein et al., 1996).
Various markers of self-referential cognition that
contribute to personal identity development undergo con-
siderable  change during childhood and adolescence; this
is  an extended period of time during which the changes
are many and varied. In toddlers, mirror self-recognition
and personal pronoun use provide early indicators of self-
development (Lewis and Carmody, 2008). Self-appraisals
featuring an evaluative component emerge in early child-
hood,  but these are both more concrete and more positive
than  self-appraisals of children in the later elementary
school years (Damon and Hart, 1988; Harter, 2006). The
self-reference effect ﬁrst emerges around the transition to
middle  childhood (5–6 years of age) and then increases
to adult levels by about age 10 (Ray et al., 2009). In par-
allel,  during this same timeframe children move from
using global information to predict others’ behaviors toitive Neuroscience 2 (2012) 55– 69
using  traits to make more accurate inferences, suggesting
that younger children do not understand the association
between psychological traits and consistent patterns of
behavior  in others or themselves (Alvarez et al., 2001).
Finally, evidence suggests children begin using social
comparisons to inform lasting self-evaluations by approx-
imately 7–9 years of age (Harter, 2006; Ruble and Frey,
1991; Stipek and MacIver, 1989), which leads to an over-
all  decline in the positivity of self-evaluations, although
in  some circumstances even preschool children use social
comparisons, especially to connect or contrast the self with
others  (Butler, 1998; Rhodes and Brickman, 2008).
Just after these important cognitive skills are acquired
in late childhood, the social landscape begins to undergo
massive changes in adolescence, particularly relating to the
questions  “what do others think about me”  and “where do
I  ﬁt in?” Another classic developmental approach (Elkind,
1967,  1985) suggests that cognitive advances related to
perspective-taking abilities are associated with attributes
people consider to be quintessentially adolescent, like self-
consciousness or belief in one’s own invulnerability and
individuality. Although this perspective has been critiqued
empirically and theoretically (Vartanian, 2000), it remains
likely  that the development of these perspective-taking
skills probably increases the ability, if not also the ten-
dency, to reason about others’ opinions of the self (Pfeifer
et  al., 2009). In addition, the relative importance of different
perspectives is shifting during this stage, dictating which
“others” are relevant. Adolescents must balance conﬂicting
needs to individuate from their parents and to feel con-
nected (Casey et al., 2010; Steinberg and Silverberg, 1986),
fueling  the necessity of developing intimate, supportive
friendships and identifying with social groups to which
they  belong (Rubin et al., 2008), including division into
cliques and crowds that differ according to behaviors and
values  (Brown, 2004). Peers therefore become much more
important (particularly in the social domain, while parents
retain  some inﬂuence in academics; Bouchey and Harter,
2005; Pfeifer et al., 2009; Steinberg and Silverberg, 1986),
as  indicated by signiﬁcant increases in time spent together
without adult supervision (Brown, 2004; Csikszentmihalyi
and Larson, 1984); acceptance by peers is critical, and rejec-
tion  is costly (Coie, 1990).
Importantly, personal and social identity development
can be seen as mutually informative. For example, both
recent theorists and pioneers in psychology (Baldwin,
1895; James, 1890; Harter, 1999; Mead, 1934) persua-
sively argue that the evaluative self-knowledge supporting
personal identity should be recognized as both as a cog-
nitive  and social construction. The consequences of this
dual  nature are that the self is signiﬁcantly affected by
the  cognitive capabilities of a given individual, as well
as  by family members, peers, and other close relation-
ship partners (although these social inputs are likely still
mediated by cognitive processes). Meanwhile, developing
a  sense of being accepted within relevant peer groups can
be  viewed as deriving in part from a growing understanding
of one’s own  abilities, values, and preferences, which either
complement or conﬂict with possible social identities. For
example,  being praised by a coach for game-winning per-
formances but chided by a parent for failures on exams
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ay  be associated with representing the self as athletic but
ot  smart, and identifying as part of the “jocks” instead of
he  “brains” in high school. In other words, what I believe
thers think about me  can affect who I think I am,  which
an  inﬂuence where I believe I ﬁt in. Finally, the driv-
ng  forces behind these cognitive and social developments
re assumed to be not only each other, but also neural
hanges. Speciﬁcally, a more developed brain (across a
ariety  of indices, including structure, function, and con-
ectivity) cultivates more advanced cognitive capacities
e.g., Paus, 2005). At the same time, the onset of puberty and
dolescence marks a turning point in relationships with
eers  and increased responsiveness in socioemotional con-
exts  (Blakemore et al., 2010; Casey et al., 2010; Nelson
t  al., 2005; Pfeifer et al., 2011; Spear, 2004; Steinberg,
008). Indeed, developmental psychologists recognize the
ombined  importance of cognitive, socioemotional, and
hysical  changes that contribute to all aspects of matura-
ion  (Dahl, 2004), and the case of self-development is no
xception.
In  this review, we hope to demonstrate the value of a
evelopmental social cognitive neuroscience approach to
he  self, as depicted in Fig. 1: both cognitive and socioe-
otional processes inﬂuence self-development (as well as
idirectionally inﬂuencing each other), and both are sup-
orted  by (and likely impact) brain structure, connectivity,
nd function. First, neuroimaging studies taking a cogni-
ive  or a social perspective on the self will be reviewed, in
hat  order. We  emphasize the socioemotional perspective –
hich  includes cultural, affective, and motivational effects
 because it may  be particularly important during self-
evelopment. Next, we describe the corresponding neu-
oimaging ﬁndings in children and adolescents, as well as
ummarize patterns of structural development in the brain
egions  identiﬁed as relevant. To conclude, we propose that
y  integrating cognitive, socioemotional, and neuroimag-
ng perspectives it is possible to achieve real advances in
nderstanding both typical and atypical self-development,
nd we brieﬂy discuss how this approach may  be relevant
o  the study of personal and social identity in various dis-
rders,  illustrated by the cases of autism and depression.
.  Cognitive perspectives
Many  aspects of cognition related to self-development
ave been explored in adults using neuroimaging tech-
iques, such as agency (Powell et al., 2010) and
elf-recognition (Kaplan et al., 2008). However, in this sec-
ion  we focus on neuroimaging evidence regarding two  key
henomena that contribute to development of personal
dentity from a cognitive viewpoint: autobiographical
emory and direct self-appraisals (speciﬁcally, retrieving
r  evaluating personal attributes or preferences). Auto-
iographical memories differ from direct self-appraisals
ecause the former are event-speciﬁc, whereas the latter
re  generalized across many instances.
Autobiographical memories are intertwined with per-
onal  identity in many ways (Fivush, 2010). They comprise
 knowledge base of general events and event-speciﬁc
nowledge spanning multiple lifetime periods, which
ndex different parts of this knowledge base, and areitive Neuroscience 2 (2012) 55– 69 57
typically very rich in imagery and sensory–perceptual
detail (Conway and Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). In adults,
autobiographical memory can be distinguished from non-
self-referential memory by activation in both medial
posterior parietal cortex (mPPC; includes precuneus, pos-
terior  cingulate, and retrosplenial cortex) and medial
prefrontal cortex (mPFC; Svoboda et al., 2006; Summerﬁeld
et  al., 2009), two  regions collectively referred to as cortical
midline structures (CMS; Northoff and Bermpohl, 2004).
In  a sense, autobiographical memory can be seen as
a  cornerstone of personal identity development – a vast
source of information about the self that is compiled
and integrated to produce self-evaluations. Neuroimaging
studies of direct self-appraisals target these byproducts,
typically asking participants to reﬂect on characteristics of
the  self, as well as varied familiar and personally known
others, and report whether evaluative traits are descriptive
of  a given target (self or other; for examples, see Johnson
et  al., 2002; Kelley et al., 2002). There has been much evi-
dence  amassed to indicate that in adults, self-appraisals
rely on CMS, similar to those found in autobiographical
memory: mPFC (spanning its ventral, anterior rostral, and
dorsal  aspects) and adjacent rostral anterior cingulate cor-
tex  (ACC), as well as mPPC (Mitchell, 2009; Northoff and
Bermpohl, 2004; Northoff et al., 2006, 2010).
2. Cortical midline structures
The  above summary suggests CMS  are prime candi-
dates for supporting cognitive processes associated with
self-development. However, an ongoing challenge in the
ﬁeld  has been to clearly specify the functional subdivisions
of mPFC and mPPC with respect to their roles in self-
appraisals and autobiographical memory. These regions are
extensive:  for example, mPFC is composed of the ante-
rior  cingulate gyrus and medial aspects of superior and
middle frontal gyri, which extends over multiple putative
Brodmann Areas (10/9/8/32/24) associated with distinct
cytoarchitectural features. Complicating matters, diverse
terminology has been used by the many different research
groups investigating mPFC function. Some groups simply
divide  mPFC into two subregions (dorsal and ventral), usu-
ally  according to the superior–inferior axis (approximately
at z = 0). Others reserve the ventral distinction for cor-
tex  located approximately 0.5–1.0 cm lower, and separate
mPFC into three subregions (dorsal, anterior rostral, and
ventral). Groups also vary as to whether they distinguish
between anterior rostral mPFC and adjacent rostral ACC. In
contrast,  the terminology has been relatively more consis-
tent  with respect to mPPC. The speciﬁc terminology used
for  the remainder of this review is depicted in Fig. 2.
In  our opinion, increased speciﬁcity will be key to
advancing the ﬁeld, both in terms of spatial location of
activations and psychological constructs (for a similar argu-
ment,  see Johnson et al., 2009, 2006). Readers should take
care  to not rely on terminology alone before a consensus
has been reached in the ﬁeld, but rather note reported loca-
tions  in coordinate space and examine rendered images
carefully. The rationale behind this viewpoint is that the
adult  literature seems to indicate each of the regions in
Fig.  2 may  carry out different aspects of self-appraisals,
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develop
nal inﬂuFig. 1. Model of cognitive, socioemotional, and neural inﬂuences on self-
cognition, socioemotional functioning, and brain development. Bidirectio
over  time in both neural and psychological components of the model.
autobiographical memory, and other identity-related phe-
nomena.
There  is an apparent gradient of specialization in mPFC,
such that dorsal aspects are engaged in more cogni-
tive aspects of self-appraisals, while ventral and anterior
rostral aspects seem sensitive to affective and motiva-
tional components (Moran et al., 2006; Ochsner et al.,
2005). Anterior rostral mPFC may  be strongly engaged
by  positive, approach-oriented, self-relevant thought such
as  reﬂection on hopes and aspirations (Johnson et al.,
2006; Packer and Cunningham, 2009), envisioning pos-
itive  future events happening to the self (D’Argembeau
et al., 2008), and prospection more generally (Addis
et al., 2007). Anterior rostral mPFC is also often referred
to  in the literature as rostral ACC, and for the pur-
poses of this review we consider these regions as a
group. Together, they may  be involved speciﬁcally in ﬁrst-
person  perspective-taking (Ames et al., 2008), shifting
between or integrating external, exogenous stimulus-
oriented attention and internally-generated, endogenous
stimulus-independent information (Burgess et al., 2007;
Gilbert  et al., 2006; Gusnard et al., 2001; Mason et al., 2007),
or  distinguishing self and other by responding preferen-
tially to the self and close or preferred others (Benoit et al.,
2010;  Chen et al., 2010; Chiao et al., 2009; Heatherton et
al.,  2006; Krienen et al., 2010; Northoff et al., 2010; Ray
et  al., 2009). In contrast, dorsal mPFC activations are asso-
ciated  with decreasing similarity between self and other
evaluated targets (Benoit et al., 2010; Jenkins et al., 2008;
Mitchell et al., 2005, 2006; Ochsner et al., 2005; Tamir and
Mitchell,  2010). To sum up, mPFC appears to support not
only  cognitive but also affective and motivational aspects
of  self-appraisals, including those that are focused on the
present/future as well as those that are abstracted and inte-
grated  from individual experiences of the past self.
Subregions in mPPC likewise exhibit varied sensitivity
to diverse aspects of self-referential processing, althoughment. In this model, three factors interact to inﬂuence self-development:
ences are noted between each of these factors, and there is noted change
investigations of mPFC functioning are not yet as abun-
dant  as studies of mPFC. In general, research suggests that
mPPC  may  serve as the basis for autonoetic conscious-
ness – that is, recalling past experiences and having the
feeling of “remembering” them (Andreasen et al., 1995;
Lou  et al., 2004; Moran et al., 2009). Imagery appears to
be  supported by more anterior aspects of the precuneus,
while posterior regions of the precuneus subserve episodic
memory retrieval (Cavanna and Trimble, 2006). In addi-
tion  to this anterior/posterior distinction in the precuneus,
a  dorsal/ventral distinction may  be present in the pos-
terior  cingulate, namely that ventral posterior cingulate
and retrosplenial cortex may  be more involved in affective
processes than dorsal aspects of mPPC (Maddock, 1999;
Vogt  and Laureys, 2005). Together, the posterior cingu-
late  and retrosplenial cortex have also been referred to as
“evaluative,” that is, assigning signiﬁcance to events and
assessing the relevance of different environmental stim-
uli  (Vogt et al., 1992). Posterior cingulate may  be focused
more externally than internally, on others in addition to
the  self, as it is implicated in both perspective-taking
(Benoit et al., 2010; Jackson et al., 2006; Pfeifer et al.,
2009) and reﬂecting on personal duties and obligations
(Johnson et al., 2006). Retrosplenial cortex appears to
be  involved in both autobiographical memory and visuo-
spatial  processing (Svoboda et al., 2006), and may  be
involved in switching between allocentric and egocentric
frames of reference during memory recall, imagery and
navigation (Vann et al., 2009). Therefore, mPPC is broadly
involved in episodic or autobiographical memory and auto-
noetic  consciousness, but also in maintaining an external
focus that extends self-perceptions beyond the individ-
ual,  and engages perspective-taking. As such, mPPC may
not  be uniquely involved in self-referential processing (Qin
and  Northoff, 2011; Qin et al., 2011), and in some stud-
ies  is observed to be more active when appraisals are
made about others than the self, perhaps as a result of
J.H. Pfeifer, S.J. Peake / Developmental Cogn
Fig. 2. Brain regions of interest for self-development. Panel A displays
a medial view of the brain with approximate locations of dorsal, ante-
rior rostral, and ventral medial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC, armPFC, and
vmPFC, respectively); dorsal, rostral, and ventral anterior cingulate cortex
(dACC, rACC, and vACC, respectively); middle cingulate cortex (MCC); and
medial  posterior parietal cortex (mPPC) which includes precuneus, poste-
rior  cingulate cortex (PCC) and retrosplenial cortex (RSC). Panel B displays
a  lateral view of the brain with approximate locations of tempo–parietal
junction (TPJ), posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS), temporal poles
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eTP), anterior insula (AI, which is underneath the lateral surface), and ven-
ral  lateral prefrontal cortex (vlPFC). Ventral striatum (VS), a subcortical
tructure, is not pictured.
he speciﬁc retrieval processes that vary across studies
Lombardo et al., 2010a). Future research should attempt to
irectly  manipulate personal familiarity and other memory
etrieval conditions that may  modulate activity in mPPC, to
est  this hypothesis more fully and help clarify the precise
ole  of mPPC in self-appraisals.
.  Socioemotional perspectives
The  above summary reveals that even when focusing
n the self from a cognitive perspective, neuroimaging
tudies of adult direct self-appraisals and autobiograph-
cal memory appear to elicit social, contextual, affective,
nd motivational processes to some extent. In this sec-
ion,  we now turn to considering three phenomena that
emonstrate the relevance of a socioemotional perspective
n  neural correlates of the self: reﬂected self-appraisals,
ultural inﬂuences on self-construals, and social exclusion
rom  peer groups.
The  psychological construct of reﬂected appraisals is
xpressed well by the question, “what do others thinkitive Neuroscience 2 (2012) 55– 69 59
about  me?,” which represents perhaps the most straight-
forward example of socioemotional inﬂuences on personal
identity development. Indeed, the actual or perceived opin-
ions  of others contained in reﬂected self-appraisals have
been  hypothesized to inform self-development for decades
(Baldwin, 1895; Cooley, 1902; Harter, 1999; Mead, 1934;
Pfeifer  et al., 2009). Unlike the accumulation of neuroimag-
ing data addressing autobiographical memory and direct
self-appraisals, there have been just a few studies exploring
the  neural bases of reﬂected self-appraisals. These stud-
ies  ﬁnd that reﬂected self-appraisals engage not only CMS,
but  also regions involved in perspective-taking and the-
ory  of mind, including TPJ and adjacent posterior superior
temporal sulcus (pSTS), as well as structures supporting
affective processing, such as temporal poles and the insula
(D’Argembeau et al., 2007; Ochsner et al., 2005; Pfeifer
et  al., invited revision under review). These additional
regions have not historically been highlighted in studies
of  adult direct self-appraisals (Northoff et al., 2006, 2010).
However, regions like TPJ, temporal poles, and the insula
have  all been receiving increasing attention for their role in
self-referential processing (Benoit et al., 2010; Enzi et al.,
2009;  Legrand and Ruby, 2009; Northoff et al., 2010; van
der  Meer et al., 2010). Our own work has demonstrated
that adults may  engage these regions during direct as well
as  reﬂected self-appraisals, in certain contexts. In a study
of  Chinese young adults, the TPJ in particular was  impli-
cated alongside CMS  in direct self-appraisals – but only
in  the social, not academic, domain (Pfeifer et al., invited
revision under review). Eastern cultures are generally con-
sidered  to be more interdependent than Western cultures
(Markus and Kitayama, 1991), such as in the social domain
in  China, yet both historical and current empirical evidence
suggests that in the academic domain Chinese individ-
uals exhibit very independent self-construals and goals,
even  exceeding their Western counterparts on average (Li,
2006).  Furthermore, to the extent participants believed
others’ reﬂected self-appraisals differed from their own
academic self-evaluations, they elicited activity in ven-
trolateral PFC (vlPFC), a region strongly associated with
response inhibition (Aron et al., 2004). These neuroimag-
ing ﬁndings suggest that direct self-appraisals may  rely
on  perceived opinions of others more in some contexts
than others, such as in relatively more interdependent than
independent domains, and that reﬂected self-appraisals
may  require one to inhibit personally-held beliefs about
the  self when the two differ.
Other  studies conducting cross-cultural comparisons
of direct self-appraisals illustrate additional contextual
effects on the neural correlates of the self. For exam-
ple, although Western (British, American, Canadian, and
Australian) and Chinese participants showed similar lev-
els  of anterior rostral mPFC activation during self- vs.
other-referential processing, Chinese participants showed
larger  anterior rostral mPFC activation for mother- vs.
other-referential processing, equal to that elicited by self-
referential processing (Zhu et al., 2007). The authors
concluded that Chinese participants employed anterior
rostral mPFC for representations of both self and mother,
reﬂecting a more interdependent social structure, whereas
Western participants only represent the self in anterior
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rostral mPFC, reﬂecting a more independent social struc-
ture.  Another study found that participants with an
individualistic self-construal exhibited greater anterior
rostral mPFC activation to general self-descriptions, like
being  shy in general, while participants with a collectivist
self-construal showed greater activation in this region to
contextual  self-descriptions, like being sociable around
one’s family (Chiao et al., 2009).
Taken together, this line of neuroimaging research on
direct  and reﬂected self-appraisals suggests that not only
do  speciﬁc individuals impact the functioning of neural
mechanisms supporting self-evaluations, so does one’s cul-
tural  milieu (Han and Northoff, 2008; Kitayama and Park,
2010).  Furthermore, dynamic cultural inﬂuences on behav-
ioral  and neural responses during self-appraisals suggest
that  these representations remain ﬂexible even in adult-
hood,  but static cultural inﬂuences are also apparent, and
may  reﬂect cultural effects on self-appraisals that may  have
been  acquired early in development (Chiao et al., 2010).
These effects may  be determined to some degree by desires
(implicit or explicit) on the part of an individual to “ﬁt in,” to
demonstrate similarity or cohesion within cultural or peer
groups  and cultivate a sense of belonging.
This leads directly to the ﬁnal socioemotional perspec-
tive we wish to consider, which is tied to social identity via
threats  to group belonging, when the question “where do I
ﬁt  in?” is answered with exclusion from a peer group. This
approach is particularly likely to be affectively or motiva-
tionally relevant during adolescence, as children who are
socially  rejected face pervasive challenges to adjustment
in the short and long-term (Brown and Huang, 1995; Coie,
1990;  Coie and Cillessen, 1993; Prinstein and Aikins, 2004;
Rubin  et al., 2006). Interestingly, however, social exclusion
and  peer rejection research is rarely connected explicitly
to  the self in the neurosciences. In adults, social exclu-
sion typically elicits activity in dorsal ACC and anterior
insula, which often increases to the extent participants feel
distressed  about being rejected, report greater rejection
sensitivity, or possess histories of rejection (Burklund et al.,
2007;  Eisenberger and Lieberman, 2004; Eisenberger et al.,
2003).  In these studies, vlPFC activity is often observed,
and inversely correlated with dorsal ACC activity – pos-
sibly  regulating feelings of distress. Other studies suggest
that  the dorsal ACC activity is due to the violation of an
expectation or implicit social rule of inclusion and fair
play,  ﬁnding instead that ventral ACC is associated more
speciﬁcally with social inclusion (Somerville et al., 2006)
or  exclusion (Bolling et al., 2010) than expectancy viola-
tions  (see also Onoda et al., 2009). Another related negative
outcome resulting from social identity is stereotype threat,
which  occurs when a member of a group that is stereotyped
as  performing poorly in a given domain subsequently per-
forms  poorly in that domain after being reminded of his
or  her relevant group membership (Steele and Aronson,
1995). A recent neuroimaging study investigating this phe-
nomenon  found that when the stereotype of poor math
performance among females was primed, participants acti-
vated  more ventral ACC, and engaged regions involved
in mathematics less (Krendl et al., 2008; see also Derks
et  al., 2008). These lines of research suggest that social
exclusion is painful, making it a very salient motivatoritive Neuroscience 2 (2012) 55– 69
of self-oriented behavior and cognition related to such
experiences, and that dorsal and ventral ACC together con-
tribute  to detecting and processing of such social evaluative
threats (Heatherton, 2011).
4. Beyond CMS
As  reviewed in the prior section, the inﬂuence of social,
cultural, affective, and motivational processes on neural
responses linked to personal and social identity can be
observed at multiple levels of interpersonal experience.
From considering what others may think about oneself
to  being included or excluded by peers, it is clear that
CMS  are not the only brain regions implicated in impor-
tant self-related functions. In this section, we  very brieﬂy
summarize the functions of these additional regions noted,
which  extend the network involved in maintaining per-
sonal  and social identity: TPJ and adjacent pSTS, temporal
poles, anterior insula, dorsal and ventral ACC, and vlPFC.
Reasoning about other people’s beliefs or other men-
tal  states via third-person perspective-taking is thought
to  rely on TPJ, a region well-known for its association
with theory-of-mind (D’Argembeau et al., 2007; Ruby and
Decety,  2003; Samson et al., 2004; Saxe and Kanwisher,
2003; Saxe and Powell, 2006), although attentional pro-
cesses  also effectively recruit this region (Mitchell, 2008).
A  primary function of the adjacent pSTS is thought to be
extracting information about goals and intentions from
biological motion within a social context, which would
support mentalizing (Pelphrey et al., 2004). Like TPJ and
pSTS,  the temporal poles have also been associated with
theory-of-mind and mentalizing (Frith and Frith, 2003),
but  seem more speciﬁcally to be involved with linking
perceptual memories of social interactions with emotions,
creating a store of social semantic memory (Olson et al.,
2007).  If correct, this would give the temporal poles a
critical  role in supporting social components of autobi-
ographical memory. The insula (particularly its anterior
aspect) is recognized for its involvement in various aspects
of  interoceptive awareness, especially in subjective feelings
associated with internal states (Craig, 2009), and has been
suggested to mediate interactions with other brain net-
works  based on the personal salience of an event (Menon
and  Uddin, 2010). Activation in anterior insula is most
likely to occur in conjunction with mPFC in self-referential
tasks with an emotional component, and has been shown
to  increase as the degree of self-relatedness of the task
or  emotion increases (Enzi et al., 2009; Modinos et al.,
2009;  Phan et al., 2004). Classically, dorsal and ventral ACC
have  been depicted as preferentially responsive to cogni-
tive  control and affect, respectively (e.g., Bush et al., 2000).
However, more current understandings suggest dorsal ACC
is  involved in detecting and evaluating conﬂict, while ven-
tral  ACC supports conﬂict regulation, in both emotional and
unemotional circumstances (Etkin et al., 2011). Dorsal ACC
activity  may  also reﬂect the distressing aspects of phys-
ical  and social pain (Eisenberger and Lieberman, 2004).
Finally, vlPFC (particularly in the right hemisphere) appears
directly responsible for exerting cognitive control to inhibit
prepotent responses, or engage in tasks where inhibition is
required  such as set switching or memory retrieval (Aron
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t al., 2004). Together, these regions highlight the impor-
ant  contributions of mentalizing, emotion, and emotion
egulation to social identity, and socioemotional aspects of
he  self.
.  Developmental perspectives
In this subsection, we discuss the growing neu-
oimaging evidence addressing the progression of self-
evelopment from various socioemotional and cognitive
erspectives. On the one hand, there are many gaps to be
lled.  To our knowledge there are no fMRI studies of auto-
iographical memory in children. This is an area ripe for
urther  inquiry given its extended developmental trajec-
ory,  and relation to parenting and discourse (Fivush, 2010).
n  addition, there are currently no developmental fMRI
tudies of how self-referential processing varies across cul-
ures,  or according to closeness or similarity to targets of
omparison. On the other hand, evidence is beginning to
ccumulate about development of brain function related
o  self-appraisals, as well as social rejection.
In the ﬁrst such study, children (ages 9–11 years) and
oung adults (ages 23–32 years) evaluated themselves
nd a familiar, ﬁctional other (Harry Potter) with refer-
nce  to social and academic competencies (Pfeifer et al.,
007).  In both groups, a region of anterior rostral mPFC
extending into dorsal mPFC and rostral ACC in children)
as more active during direct appraisals of self than
ther. Only adults engaged dorsal mPFC more when eval-
ating  the other social target than themselves. During
elf-appraisals, children showed more activation in ante-
ior  rostral mPFC than adults, even engaging it above a
esting  baseline (a pattern that is rarely observed in adults
uring  self-appraisals). A similar pattern was seen in a sub-
equent  study (Pfeifer et al., 2009) of early adolescents
ages 11–14 years) and young adults (ages 23–30 years).
ather than contrasting evaluations of self and other, direct
nd  reﬂected self-appraisals were compared. Yet the same
ondition as in the prior study (i.e., the process of mak-
ng  direct self-evaluations in social and academic domains)
ngaged anterior rostral and dorsal mPFC and ACC more
n  adolescents than adults, and activated anterior rostral
PFC  above a resting baseline in adolescents but not adults.
 third fMRI study found that for 7–13-year-old boys,
ecall of psychological trait words increased with age when
he  words were referenced to the self, but not when the
ords  were referenced to the subjects’ mother (Ray et al.,
009).  The neural basis of this developing self-reference
ffect was traced to activation in regions involved in the
rocessing of emotion and memory, including rostral and
entral  ACC, inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), and the caudate
ead.
Together these studies suggest anterior rostral and dor-
al  mPFC, as well as dorsal, rostral, and ventral ACC, are all
ore  active in child or adolescent direct self-appraisals, in
omparison with young adults. Based on the prior infor-
ation in this review, there are several interpretations ofhese  ﬁndings that can be proposed. One possibility is that
hildren  and adolescents are engaging in more active pro-
esses  of integration and abstraction of self-knowledge –
onstructing self-appraisals rather than efﬁciently retriev-itive Neuroscience 2 (2012) 55– 69 61
ing  them (Pfeifer et al., 2007). The dorsal and ventral
ACC activations suggest that perhaps direct self-appraisals
elicited conﬂict detection and regulation processes (Pfeifer
et  al., 2009), such as that which might be expected when
self-evaluations are inﬂuenced by multiple, sometimes
conﬂicting perspectives (see Harter, 1999). In addition,
there may  be more overlap between self and others during
childhood (Pfeifer et al., 2007; Ray et al., 2009). Together,
these proposals lead to the prediction that longitudinal
changes in responses from these regions during direct self-
appraisals may  be related to the individuation process
across the transition to adolescence, as teenagers develop
stable personal identities, although self-concepts continue
to  evolve over the lifespan.
During  this identity development process in adoles-
cence, however, what others think about the self may  be
intertwined with who they think they are – even on a neu-
ral  level. In an fMRI study comparing direct self-appraisals
with reﬂected self-appraisals from various viewpoints
(Pfeifer et al., 2009), adolescents engaged CMS  (anterior
rostral and dorsal mPFC, mPPC) as well as TPJ, pSTS, and
temporal poles during all forms of self-appraisals – both
direct and reﬂected, unlike adults. CMS  were most respon-
sive  when adolescents took their best friend’s perspective
on their social attributes, and their mom’s  perspective on
their  academic abilities. These ﬁndings are consistent with
the  idea that vulnerability of self-perceptions to social
inﬂuences may  be ampliﬁed in adolescence, as inclusion
and afﬁliation with peers becomes increasingly important,
and  developing personal and social identities that foster a
sense  of continuity, coherence, and belonging emerges as
a  major developmental task (Brown, 2004; Erikson, 1968;
Marcia,  1980; Steinberg and Silverberg, 1986). It would be
interesting  for future studies to explore whether individual
differences in engagement of perspective-taking regions
during direct self-appraisals in adolescence predicts out-
comes  like social anxiety, or susceptibility to peer inﬂuence
over  behavior and perceptions (for a similar line of inquiry
with  respect to emotion processing, see Guyer et al., 2008).
Perhaps excessive recruitment of a region like TPJ during
adolescent direct self-appraisals is associated with greater
risk.  Clearly, a variety of implications for health, aca-
demics, and general well-being can be derived from these
hypotheses, making them important targets for future
research.
As  personal and social identity development proceed
in tandem, and peers become increasingly important, the
costs  of rejection may  become increasingly salient. Inter-
estingly, the adolescent pattern of neural response to social
exclusion is both similar to and different from that of
adults. In one of the initial fMRI studies of adolescent peer
rejection, the insula (but not the dorsal ACC) was rela-
tively more activated during social exclusion than inclusion
(Masten et al., 2009). Meanwhile, vlPFC, ventral striatum,
and  dorsal mPFC were negatively correlated with activ-
ity  in regions that may  have indexed distress responses,
including dorsal ACC, insula, amygdala, and ventral ACC. In
another  study, anticipations of peer rejection or acceptance
were combined with a reﬂected self-appraisal process,
in  which brain activity was  assessed while adolescents
reported whether they thought a peer was interested in
tal Cogn
in frontal CMS  thus followed an inferior to superior
progression with a simultaneous anterior to posterior pro-
gression.  This corresponds to a general sequence in which
1 It should be noted that there are many ways of interpreting what
these metrics of structural brain development mean at a cellular level.
For example, changes in cortical thickness may  represent proliferation of
myelin  into the cortical neuropil (Sowell et al., 2004), synaptic pruning,
and so on.
2 Although this study focused on cortical maturation, given that the VS
also emerged as a region of interest in this review, readers are referred to a62 J.H. Pfeifer, S.J. Peake / Developmen
interacting with them. Interestingly, both ventral striatum
and  insula activity increased with age for female but not
male  adolescents, when attempting to judge the interest
of  peers with whom participants previously reported they
were  more interested in interacting (Guyer et al., 2009).
This  suggests the threat of rejection from appealing peers
becomes increasingly distressing to adolescent girls, and
they  may  have to engage greater regulatory resources to
cope.  Yet another study found that ventral mPFC/ACC and
the  striatum were engaged when children, adolescents, and
adults  received social acceptance feedback, or expected
to  receive positive social evaluations, and the activity of
these  regions increased with age while expecting pos-
itive  feedback (Gunther Moor et al., 2010). Meanwhile,
lateral PFC among other regions was increasingly involved
in  processing social rejection feedback with age. One may
hypothesize that, following social exclusion, failures to reg-
ulate  (using vlPFC, ventral striatum, dorsal mPFC, or some
combination thereof) may  be associated with greater dis-
tress  and probability that the peer rejection will be marked
as  self-relevant. Future studies should continue to build
upon  methods of studying neural responses to actual or
anticipated peer rejection in a way that allows for the
assessment of its impact on personal and social identity,
such as self-evaluations of interpersonal competence or
desire  to afﬁliate with various peer groups.
6. Brain development
The  previous subsections have highlighted a set of core
brain  regions implicated in personal and social identity
development: CMS  including mPFC (ventral, dorsal, and
anterior  rostral aspects, as well as adjacent rostral ACC)
and  mPPC (precuneus, posterior cingulate, and retrosple-
nial  cortex). Other regions have also been implicated in
a  more extended network relevant to self-development,
particularly when viewed from a social perspective: TPJ,
pSTS,  temporal poles, dorsal and ventral ACC, vlPFC, ven-
tral  striatum, and anterior insula. Understanding their
contributions to self-development may  be buoyed by
understanding neuroanatomical development in these
regions, which includes changes in the structural com-
position of the brain and in the dynamic aspects of how
different brain regions function alone and interactively.
In other words, the trajectories of both structural and
functional development may  directly impact social and
cognitive functioning in a manner that holds meaning-
ful implications for understanding self-development. For
example,  a recent study showed that structural matura-
tion of the left TPJ was related to mirror self-recognition,
personal pronoun use, and pretend play in toddlers (Lewis
and  Carmody, 2008), suggesting brain development may
inﬂuence self-development even at a very early age. In this
subsection, we summarize the available information about
the  development of these regions from a biological per-
spective.Different brain regions involved in self-referential
processing have different structural developmental tra-
jectories. While there are many metrics of structural
development (e.g., volume, gray and white matter den-itive Neuroscience 2 (2012) 55– 69
sity),  we choose to focus here on cortical thickness.1
Gray matter exhibits an early period of rapid growth in
childhood followed by a gradual thinning that extends
into adulthood (Gogtay et al., 2004; Groeschel et al.,
2010; Huttenlocher, 1979). Within this overall growth
trend, however, the trajectories of reaching maximum
cortical thickness vary for individual CMS  components
and other regions supporting cognitive functions of the
self.  A recent cohort-sequential study examined cortical
development in a large sample of typically developing
children, adolescents, and young adults (N = 375, ages
3.5–33.0 years; Shaw et al., 2008). The trajectory of cortical
thickness in different regions frequently corresponded
with cytoarchitecture, such that the most primitive cortex
(i.e.,  allocortex) displayed linear decreases in cortical
thickness, transitional cortex displayed quadratic func-
tions  over the age range sampled (increases followed by
decreases, but lacking stabilization by the third decade of
life),  and homotypical isocortex displayed cubic functions
(increases followed by decreases and then stabilization
in the third decade of life). In addition to distinguishing
regional patterns of cortical maturation,2 the study also
provided animated representations of changes in cortical
thickness between ages 5.0–15.0, which allow for the
estimation of potentially meaningful structural milestones
during a period that is critical for self-development (see
http://neuro.cjb.net/content/vol28/issue14/images/data/
3586/DC1/Movie2 medial.mov). We  have used these
representations to estimate the approximate age range
of  maximum cortical thickness in regions supporting
personal and social identity development. Since peak
cortical thickness can only be estimated if a region shows
a  non-linear (i.e., quadratic or cubic) growth function,
some regions of interest in this review could not be esti-
mated due to linear trajectories. Areas with linear growth
functions, or those that were not reported speciﬁcally
in the tables or depicted in the supplementary movies,
included anterior insula, temporal poles, ventral striatum,
and  much of ventral ACC and retrosplenial cortex.
Cortical thickness in frontal regions of the CMS peaked
ﬁrst in ventral mPFC at around age 8.0–8.5 years. Begin-
ning slightly later, anterior rostral mPFC reached maximum
cortical thickness between 9.0 and 9.5 years, and ros-
tral  ACC between 9.0 and 10.5 years. The progression of
peak  thickness continued upward to reach dorsal mPFC
at  10.0–10.5 years. The trend of cortical developmentrecent  study that examined trajectories of subcortical maturation (Ostby
et  al., 2009). In this study, the basal ganglia exhibited a linear decrease
in gray matter volume (corrected for total brain volume) from ages 8–31
years, although the relationship between volume and age was weaker in
the  caudate than the putamen, pallidum, or accumbens.
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ffective or motivational processes (associated with ventral
nd  anterior rostral mPFC) may  be primary, and cog-
itive processes (associated with dorsal mPFC) may  be
econdary. The progression also suggests there may  be
ore  overlap between representations of self and oth-
rs  early in development, with differentiation emerging
oncurrently with the individuation process during the
ransition to adolescence. Posterior regions of the CMS
ollowed a different developmental sequence, progress-
ng  from superior-posterior regions to anterior-inferior
egions. Maximum cortical thickness was reached ﬁrst in
he  precuneus between 8.0 and 10.0 years, continuing in
nterior  and inferior directions, to gradually encompass the
osterior  cingulate between 9.0 and 11.5 years. Several of
he  regions identiﬁed previously in addition to CMS  were
stimable. vlPFC reached peak cortical thickness around
ge  9.0–9.5 years bilaterally. While peak cortical thickness
n  TPJ was more difﬁcult to estimate, it may  be reached as
arly  as 8.0–9.0 years in the right hemisphere, and in the
eft  hemisphere around age 8.5–9.5 years, although regions
f  adjacent superior temporal gyrus (which may  include
STS) did not peak in cortical thickness until approxi-
ately 15.0 years. Most of dorsal (and some aspects of
entral) ACC peaked between 11.0 and 13.5 years. Finally,
lthough anterior insula exhibited a linear trajectory, mid-
le  and posterior insula peaked in cortical thickness quite
ate,  around 18.0 years of age. Together, these developmen-
al trajectories suggest mentalizing, emotion, and emotion
egulation processes might become increasingly important
s  children move into adolescence. Future studies should
xplore the relative contributions of biological and other
ontextual factors to these patterns, ranging from the onset
f  puberty to shifts toward greater peer orientation within
 changing social landscape.
The  participation of both frontal and parietal regions
n personal and social identity processes points to another
mportant factor: the development of structural and func-
ional  connectivity that supports communication between
egions, which is associated with the maturation of white
atter. In contrast to gray matter, white matter devel-
pment shows a steady increase into adulthood (Giedd
t  al., 1999; Tamnes et al., 2010) that may  inﬂuence neural
onnectivity both within CMS  regions and between CMS
nd  other regions, like TPJ. Studies show that in middle
hildhood, these regions exhibit stronger local, short-
ange connections, but over time (through adolescence into
oung  adulthood), long-range connections are strength-
ned (Dosenbach et al., 2010; Fair et al., 2008; Supekar et al.,
010).  Using TPJ involvement in reﬂected self-appraisals
s an example, this may  mean that in childhood, TPJ out-
uts  (my  classmates think I’m bad at sports) may  not be
onveyed as well to frontal regions such as mPFC as to
osterior regions such as mPPC. Reﬂected self-appraisals
t this early stage may  draw primarily on autobiographical
emories (the time I let the other team score the winning
oal and everyone was mad  at me)  in short-range, medial
arietal regions. Perhaps to the extent these reﬂected self-
ppraisals and autobiographical memories are emotionally
alient, such content will be integrated and incorporated
nto self-evaluations, after connectivity between parietal
nd  frontal regions matures. An alternative prediction isitive Neuroscience 2 (2012) 55– 69 63
that,  if the entire network is maturing, other processes that
recruit  this network should show similar developmental
patterns (see Burnett and Blakemore, 2009). This derives
from  viewing the maturational changes in this network
more broadly, perhaps as exhibiting a combination of pat-
terns:  an anterior-to-posterior shift (Sebastian et al., 2008),
complemented by increased specialization across develop-
ment  in posterior cortical regions (Saxe et al., 2009).
Researchers should ultimately aspire to examine
aspects of personal and social identity development con-
currently with both structural and functional neuroimag-
ing during the transition from childhood to adolescence,
ideally in a longitudinal sample, to work towards disen-
tangling cognitive, socioemotional, and biological effects.
It  is important to note that the brain represents just
one of many possible biological contributions. Although
brain function and structure are the biological factors
that have received the most empirical attention thus far,
widening the research base to include greater study of
neuroendocrine, psychophysiological, genetic, and electro-
physiological factors that contribute to self-development
will be critical in the future.
7.  Atypical self-development
This  review demonstrates not only that neural foun-
dations of self and identity can be considered from a
cognitive perspective, but also that there are important
socioemotional inﬂuences to take into account, as well as
bidirectional inﬂuences among these two factors and brain
development. Taken together, the neuroimaging evidence
from  child and adolescent samples points to a critical role
for  mentalizing, emotion, and emotion regulation in typ-
ical  self-development – more so than perhaps would be
anticipated from adult studies alone, although that work
has  nicely highlighted the importance of social context
in  investigations that compare self-evaluations across cul-
tures,  or with evaluations of similar or close others. Brain
regions associated with affective and motivational pro-
cesses,  such as anterior rostral mPFC, ventral posterior
cingulate, ventral striatum, insula, and ventral ACC (Guyer
et  al., 2009; Masten et al., 2009; Pfeifer et al., 2007, 2009;
Ray  et al., 2009), have been found to be more engaged in
children  and adolescents compared to adults, suggesting a
signiﬁcant  contribution of emotion to personal and social
identity development. Given this greater affective content,
it  is little wonder that regulatory demands may  be greater
across various self-relevant tasks: deciding who I am, con-
sidering  what others think about me,  and making efforts to
ﬁt  in that are sometimes rebuffed. Perhaps areas involved
in  inhibition and the detection or regulation of conﬂict,
like vlPFC or dorsal and ventral ACC, are not only involved
in  direct self-appraisals and responses to social exclusion
during adolescence (Masten et al., 2009; Pfeifer et al.,
2009), but will also be observed in adolescent reﬂected
self-appraisals and autobiographical memories. Finally, the
neuroimaging evidence also suggests self-development not
only  surges in tandem with emotions, but also draws
deeply on mentalizing resources, and hinges on experi-
ences and connections with peers, family members, and
others.  This is illustrated by greater recruitment of brain
tal Cogn64 J.H. Pfeifer, S.J. Peake / Developmen
regions involved in perspective-taking, like TPJ and mPPC,
during  both direct and reﬂected self-appraisals in adoles-
cence  than adulthood (Pfeifer et al., 2009).
These conclusions imply self-development is likely to
be  perturbed in disorders that affect mentalizing abili-
ties  or are associated with atypical emotion processing
and regulation, such as autism or depression (although
many other disorders exhibit disrupted self-development,
such as social anxiety, borderline personality disorder, and
schizophrenia, but addressing each is beyond the scope
of  this review). There is a growing body of evidence that
brain  function during self-appraisals and social exclusion
differs from adult norms in these and other populations.
For example, recent studies of adults with autism have
begun to demonstrate that mentalizing capabilities are
positively associated with various indicators of personal
identity (such as self-consciousness and the self-reference
effect; Lombardo et al., 2007), which again suggests that
these  capabilities rely on each other for typical develop-
ment and functioning to some meaningful extent. Similar
patterns have been observed in children with autism, who
frequently demonstrate deﬁcits in autobiographical mem-
ory,  prospection, the self-reference effect, and many other
gauges  of self-development (for reviews, see Hobson et al.,
2006;  Lind and Bowler, 2008; Lombardo and Baron-Cohen,
2010).
In one fMRI study, ventral and anterior rostral mPFC
were hypoactive in adults with autism during direct
self-appraisals and unlike neurotypical controls, did not
distinguish between self and other on average (Lombardo
et  al., 2010b; for similar ﬁndings, see Chiu et al., 2008;
Kennedy and Courchesne, 2008). Interestingly, middle cin-
gulate  cortex (MCC; another structure located on the
cortical midline) was also differentially recruited by the
two  groups of participants. Speciﬁcally, when making men-
talizing  judgments MCC  was more active for self than other
in  neurotypical adults, but it was more active for other
than self in adults with autism. In other words, MCC  pref-
erentially responded to other-appraisals in autism, rather
than  the normative pattern of activating more during self-
appraisals. Finally, greater engagement of ventral mPFC
for  self than other was observed in those individuals who
evidenced less impairment on a retrospective diagnostic
autism assessment providing a clinical measure of recip-
rocal  social impairment. Together these results may  imply
that  in the case of autism, one core challenge is that self-
appraisals are not tagged with the same affective and
motivational content as in typical development. Similar
arguments have been made with respect to deﬁcits in self-
awareness and theory-of-mind in schizophrenia and alex-
ithymia,  namely that difﬁculties in comprehending one’s
own  affective states and impaired capabilities for affective
mentalizing are interrelated at behavioral and neural lev-
els  (Moriguchi et al., 2006; Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2007).
Another core challenge in these disorders may  be that
mentalizing deﬁcits impair the ability to make reﬂected
self-appraisals with the ease and frequency of neurotypical
adolescents. As of yet, there are no published fMRI studies
of  children or adolescents with autism or these other disor-
ders  engaging in direct or reﬂected self-appraisals, but this
is  a promising avenue for future research.itive Neuroscience 2 (2012) 55– 69
It is worth noting that in neurotypical adults, excessive
self-referential behavior was  associated with poor men-
talizing, unlike in adults with autism (Lombardo et al.,
2007). In other words, there may  be a non-linear function
characterizing the involvement of mentalizing regions in
personal  and social identity development, such that too
much  may  be as harmful as too little. Recent fMRI studies
of  depression provide support for this hypothesis, ﬁnding
that  both depressed and neurotypical adults engage ante-
rior  rostral mPFC during self-appraisals, but that depressed
adults engage more dorsal and/or anterior rostral mPFC
(including rostral ACC), dorsal ACC, and dorsolateral PFC
(dlPFC;  Lemogne et al., 2009; Yoshimura et al., 2010).
These activations have been interpreted to reﬂect excessive
self-focus, negative affect, and resultant need for greater
cognitive control. In one of these studies, greater depres-
sive  symptoms were correlated with anterior rostral mPFC
activity  (including rostral ACC) during self-appraisals, and
responses  in these regions were furthermore positively
correlated with amygdala responses (Yoshimura et al.,
2010;  see also Lemogne et al., 2010). To our knowl-
edge, there are no published fMRI studies of depressed
children or adolescents engaging in direct or reﬂected
self-appraisals. However, enhanced responses to reward in
anterior  rostral mPFC, and diminished responses to reward
in  ventral striatum, have been associated with greater
depressive symptoms and less daily positive affect in an
fMRI  study of neurotypical adolescents (Forbes et al., 2010),
and  depressed adolescents similarly engaged less ventral
striatum and more anterior rostral mPFC, dorsal ACC, and
dlPFC  (Forbes et al., 2009). A recent behavioral study also
found  that overly general autobiographical memories were
predictive  of concurrent and subsequent depressive symp-
tomatology among adolescent girls (Hipwell et al., 2011;
see  also Drummond et al., 2006).
Finally, a common problem faced by children and
adolescents with depression or autism is peer rejec-
tion (Attwood, 2008; Boivin and Hymel, 1997; Boivin
et  al., 1994; Little, 2001; Sebastian et al., 2009), which in
the  developmental psychology literature is often explic-
itly  connected with negative social self-appraisals. Two
published studies relating neural responses to social exclu-
sion  with depressive symptomatology have produced
results consistent with the idea that exaggerated affective
responses (and associated regulatory responses) to rejec-
tion  are present in this context as well. Neurotypical young
adults  with low self-esteem demonstrated greater dorsal
and  ventral ACC responses during social exclusion, and
reported greater distress afterwards (Onoda et al., 2010).
In  adolescence, greater ventral ACC responses to social
exclusion were associated with longitudinal increases in
parent-reported depressive symptoms 1 year after the fMRI
scan  (Masten et al., 2011b). Similar to the patterns demon-
strated with respect to self-appraisals, wherein autism was
associated  with hypoactivation and depression with hyper-
activation of relevant neural systems, one may  hypothesize
that in children, adolescents, or adults with autism, less
affective or mentalizing responses to social exclusion will
be  observed. This was  conﬁrmed in recent studies of
high-functioning adolescents with autism, who  displayed
signiﬁcantly less activity than neurotypical adolescents in
tal Cogn
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egions including anterior insula, ventral ACC, vlPFC, and
entral  striatum during social exclusion relative to inclu-
ion  (Bolling et al., 2011; Masten et al., 2011a; McPartland
t al., 2011; for discussion, see Sebastian and Blakemore,
011).
Comparisons between these two populations (children
nd adolescents with autism and depression) should pay
eed  to their different patterns of onset and prevalence
y gender. Autism is more common among males, while
epression is more common among females. Autism is
lso  typically diagnosed early in life (by 3 years of age),
hile rates of depression signiﬁcantly increase in adoles-
ence, particularly among girls. Clearly, variations in the
nset  and nature of these disorders will be associated with
ifferent  stages of cognitive, socioemotional, and neuro-
ogical maturation. Furthermore, challenges in one aspect
f  development are likely to affect the others, creating a
otential  cascade of effects. Factors such as these may  be
ntrinsically related to the patterns of functioning observed
n  each population.
.  Conclusion
In  summary, fMRI data from neurotypical children and
dolescents as well as youth and adults with autism,
epression, and other disorders conﬁrm how critical the
ocioemotional perspective on self-development may  be
o  understanding how our complex sense of the self –
s  unique and yet connected with others – is supported
y the brain. The trajectories of cortical development in
MS  (mPFC and mPPC) and the more extended group of
egions  identiﬁed in this review (including TPJ, pSTS, tem-
oral  poles, insula, dorsal and ventral ACC, ventral striatum,
nd  vlPFC) suggest that mentalizing, emotion, and emotion
egulation processes elicited by reﬂected self-appraisals
nd social exclusion may  play very important roles in per-
onal  and social identity formation around the transition
o  adolescence. As constrained by structural brain devel-
pment, this may  be a period when self-development is
ost  sensitive to affective, motivational, interpersonal, or
ultural  inﬂuences (see Casey et al., 2010). Conversely,
he accumulation of experiences within a speciﬁc relation-
hip,  peer group, or cultural context may  ultimately affect
nderlying biology, to facilitate diminished, enhanced, or
ven  excessive responses in brain regions that support
he socioemotional and cognitive construction of the self.
e  are only just beginning to understand the neural sys-
ems  involved in typical and atypical self-development, but
ach  step towards identifying component processes pro-
ides  the opportunity to intervene in ways that will help
ll  individuals develop full and healthy personal and social
dentities.
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